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ABSTRACT 
The United States military is not immune to the effects of the current recession.  Many 
areas of military compensation are being considered for reduction and elimination in 
order to alleviate budget constraints throughout the federal government.  Questions have 
arisen regarding the degree to which retention goals would be met if special bonus pay 
programs were reduced or eliminated.    Mattock and Arkes (2007) claimed success with 
predicting the retention of Air Force pilots by using their Dynamic Retention Model 
(DRM).  This thesis utilizes the DRM, coded for R by Mattock and Arkes, to create a 
simulation of Naval aviator retention at different bonus amounts.  The model predicted a 
75.2% retention rate with a bonus of $25,000 per year for five years, a retention rate of 
64.3% with a bonus of $15,000 per year for five years, and a retention rate of 50.6% with 
a bonus of $5,000 per year.  It predicted that only 14 Naval Aviators (0.46%) would 
remain past their minimum service requirement if the bonus were discontinued.  A 
critique of the DRM is that it is an econometric approach that leaves out demographic 
factors.  A logistic regression with demographic variables was found to be better for 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In 2009, Vice Admiral Mark Ferguson, then Chief of Naval Personnel, testified to 
Congress that a thorough review of all bonus programs administered by the U.S. Navy 
would be forthcoming (CNP, 2010).  The Aviation Career Continuation Pay (ACCP) was 
one of the programs to be evaluated.  In a time of “belt-tightening” across services, it is 
no surprise that these programs are coming under increasing scrutiny with a need to 
justify themselves.  With some aviators capable of earning bonuses as high as $25,000 
per year for five years, this large sum of money needed to be reviewed for its cost-
effectiveness when all eligible aviators are considered. 
With fewer high paying airline jobs being readily available, there may be less 
allure for a Naval Aviator to seek a better job in the civilian sector.  If one has the good 
fortune to be offered one of these jobs, it may not necessarily come with the promise of 
better working hours and benefits comparable to those that are available to members of 
the military.  The service may be able to keep enough qualified aviators without an 
annual bonus of $25,000.   
The ACCP was designed to “provide selected bonuses as an incentive to eligible 
pilots and naval flight officers through department head, sea duty and command billets” 
(CNP, 2010).  Yet the military is faced with the task of reducing budgets, and bonuses are 
not exempt from being reduced or discontinued.  Further, declining economic conditions 
have made civilian job opportunities less plentiful in all fields, potentially creating an 
incentive for military personnel to continue military service.  For these reasons, we can 
ask whether the ACCP is fulfilling its role of providing enough aviators to accomplish the 
mission of the United States Navy.  If this bonus is truly required to maintain proper pilot 
manning levels, then the goal of this study is to prove that the ACCP is essential and 
should not be considered in the realm of possible budget cuts. 
Mattock and Arkes (2007) claimed to find success with predicting the retention of 
Air Force pilots by using their Dynamic Retention Model (DRM).  Up to this point, there 
has yet to be a study in which this model is used with Navy data to look at the retention 
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of Naval Aviators.  This thesis utilizes the DRM as implemented in the statistical 
program R (R Development Core Team, 2011), using code developed by Mattock and 
Arkes (2007).  The R code was modified for the Navy to take into account Navy bonus 
amounts that differ from the Air Force.  It was also modified to look only at the 
probability of remaining in the Navy at the conclusion of the minimum service 
obligation, as opposed to looking at all possible years following the MSR.  The R 
implementation then produced a simulation of the expected retention rates for various 
bonus amounts.   
The model predicted a 75.2% retention rate with a bonus of $25,000 per year for 
five years, a retention rate of 64.3% with a bonus of $15,000 per year for five years, and a 
retention rate of 50.6% with a bonus of $5,000 per year.  This model predicted that only 
14 Naval Aviators (0.46%) would remain past their minimum service requirement if the 
bonus were to be discontinued.   
A logistic multiple regression was run with the following independent variables: 
commissioning source (source), length of initial service obligation (liso), race and sex 
combined (RaceSex), and rank at the time of making the retention decision (rank).  The 
dependent variable was whether or not a pilot took the ACCP (“Stay” or “Leave”).  
Source was not a significant factor in predicting a decision to stay or leave. RaceSex was 
found to be significant independent variable.  Specifically, non-black females are highly 
likely to leave naval aviation.  Length of initial service obligation was found to be a 
significant independent variable.  Those with a length of initial service of 10 or more 
years are more likely to leave naval aviation than those with a service obligation of eight 
years or fewer. Finally, rank was found to be a significant independent variable.  Those of 
rank O-4 or senior (O4+) were more likely to remain in the Navy as pilots than pilots of 
rank O-3. 
There were problems with the model, and for several reasons, the DRM was not 
considered a good method for making predictions about Naval aviator retention.  The 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the effect of Aviation Career Continuation 
Pay (ACCP) on the retention of Naval Aviators in the United States Navy.  This study 
examines the extent to which the ACCP impacts the retention of Naval Aviators.  Further, 
this study examines the possible reasons that these officers choose to remain in the 
service, and the extent to which the ACCP is the primary factor that compels a Naval 
Aviator to continue his or her service.   
B. PROBLEM  
In 2009, Vice Admiral Mark Ferguson, then Chief of Naval Personnel, testified to 
Congress that a thorough review of all bonus programs administered by the U.S. Navy 
would be forthcoming (CNP, 2010).  The ACCP was one of the programs to be 
evaluated.  In a time of “belt-tightening” across services, it is no surprise that these 
programs are coming under increasing scrutiny with a need to justify themselves.  With 
some aviators capable of earning bonuses as high as $25,000 per year for five years, this 
large sum of money needed to be reviewed for its cost-effectiveness when all eligible 
aviators are considered. 
Also in 2009, the director of Personnel, Plans, and Policy Division at 
Headquarters, U.S. Navy stated that “We are committed to continuing our investment in 
the aviation community and our efforts remain responsive to retention behavior and 
mission requirements” (CNP, 2010).  Perhaps there are other factors that come into play 
when a Naval Aviator makes the decision whether to continue his or her service or not.  
One big consideration is the availability of jobs in the civilian community and aviation 
industry.  The events of September 11, 2001, served as a catalyst for widespread changes 
in the airline industry.  In just over a decade, numerous airlines have merged or have 
ceased to exist altogether.  Existing commercial airlines have been forced to lay off even 
the most experienced pilots during the time of airline mergers and bankruptcies, and 
lowered the retirement age to 60.   
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In addition to the decline in airline jobs, there is an overall decline in the pay of 
aviation professionals.  Not long ago, a seasoned airline pilot could earn as much as 
$300,000 per year, and sometimes more, for flying international routes (McCartney, 
2009).  In recent years, the maximum salary for an airline captain is around $165,000 per 
year, while the average starting pilot at a major airline can expect to earn roughly 
$36,000 per year (McCartney, 2009). 
With fewer high paying airline jobs being readily available, there may be less 
allure for a naval aviator to seek a better job in the civilian sector.  If one has the good 
fortune to be offered one of these jobs, it may not come with the promise of better 
working hours and comparable benefits to those that are available to members of the 
military. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The ACCP was designed to “provide selected bonuses as an incentive to eligible 
pilots and naval flight officers through department head, sea duty and command billets” 
(CNP, 2010).  Yet the military is faced with the task of reducing budgets, and bonuses are 
not exempt from being reduced or discontinued.  Further, declining economic conditions 
have made civilian job opportunities less plentiful in all fields, potentially creating 
incentive for military personnel to continue military service.  For these reasons, is the 
ACCP fulfilling its role of providing enough aviators to accomplish the mission of the 
United States Navy?  Or, is it possible that there is another explanation?  If this bonus is 
truly required to maintain proper pilot manning levels, then the goal of this study is to 
prove that the ACCP is essential and should not be considered in the realm of possible 
budget cuts.   
This study aims to answer two questions: 
1) How does the ACCP impact the retention of Naval Aviators in the United 
States Navy?   
2) How would aviator retention be impacted if the ACCP program were to be 
altered, or discontinued altogether?   
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D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This study begins with a review of available literature that have studied the 
retention of officers in all branches of the armed forces.  The focus of the literature 
review is on factors that compel an officer to remain on active duty in the military after 
his or her Minimum Service Requirement (MSR) has been fulfilled. 
The following steps are used to answer the study questions posed in this thesis: 
 A review of the literature, including articles on past research in the field of 
military bonuses and retention.  For the purposes of this study, 
government publications are reviewed to gain an understanding of the 
Aviation Career Continuation Pay. 
 Data from Bureau of Personnel (BUPERS) Aviation Community Manager 
was evaluated for a specific cohort of Naval Aviators.  This information 
includes demographics, data on whether or not the ACCP was accepted 
when it was offered to each aviator, and whether that person remained on 
active duty beyond the MSR. 
 Statistical methods used in the analysis are described. 
 Statistical analysis and results are presented, with recommendations on 
how to further administer the ACCP. 
 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The current chapter describes the purpose of this research, including the research 
questions that are to be answered, as well as the scope and methodology.  Chapter II is 
the literature review, which includes an introduction, and a description of studies that 
have analyzed bonus programs in other services and other occupational specialties.  
Chapter III describes the ACCP program, including its history and the current status of 
the program.  Chapter IV describes the data and the development of the model and data 
analysis.  Chapter V gives the results of the analysis.  Chapter VI is a summary and 
recommendations for the ACCP program.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Numerous studies have focused on various continuation pays for military officers, 
as well as re-enlistment bonuses for enlisted military personnel.  There is a wide variation 
in these bonuses, in terms of entitlement, payment methods and amounts, while all are 
aimed at maintaining required levels of personnel in specified career specialties.  There 
have been many different conclusions with regard to the efficacy of these programs. 
B. THE AIR FORCE AVIATION CONTINUATION PAY (ACP) 
Like other services, the Air Force has experienced problems related to retaining 
high-quality pilots once their initial service obligation has expired.  In fact, the problem 
of retaining pilots is especially pronounced, and is at the top of a list of four officer 
specialties that experience issues related to retention. A loss of a promising pilot is a loss 
of a great amount of time and money that has been invested in developing that skilled 
pilot, and one who will be ready for potential battle.  In 2007, RAND Corporation 
published “The Dynamic Retention Model for Air Force Officers.”  In the past, the 
Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model was that of choice when analyzing ways to 
address retention issues.  The ACOL is a useful model for determining how changes in 
compensation will impact retention, but it fails to address other issues.  Mattock and 
Arkes (2007) cite the uncertainty of the future, as well as “random shock,” as factors that 
are significant in impacting retention decisions.   
Using the Dynamic Retention Model (DRM), researchers Michael Mattock and 
Jeremy Arkes evaluate how the Air Force Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) program 
affects retention of Air Force pilots.  This model varies from the ACOL because it 
attempts to model future uncertainty and “shocks” discussed above.  Mattock and Arkes 
asserted that eliminating the ACP as a retention bonus and incentive to remain on active 
duty would result in a loss of up to 15 percent of Air Force pilots.  
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Mattock and Arkes (2007) claimed to find success with predicting the retention of 
Air Force pilots by using their Dynamic Retention Model (DRM).  Up to this point, there 
has yet to be a study in which this model is used with Navy data to look at the retention 
of Naval Aviators, and this thesis seeks to remedy the omission.  This thesis utilizes the 
DRM as implemented in the statistical program R (R Development Core Team, 2011), 
using code developed by Mattock and Arkes (2007).  The R code was modified for the 
Navy to take into account Navy bonus amounts that differ from the Air Force.  It was also 
modified to look only at the probability of remaining in the Navy at the conclusion of the 
MSR, as opposed to looking at all possible years following the MSR.  The R 
implementation then produced a simulation of the expected retention rates for various 
bonus amounts.   
C. ANNUALIZED COST OF LIVING APPROACH AND NAVAL AVIATORS 
Mills (1999) evaluated the potential retention effects of the ACCP using an 
ACOL approach.  At that time, the ACCP was still in the planning phase, and the ACP 
was the bonus being offered to Naval Aviators.  Mills looked at this new system by 
evaluating both financial incentives for an aviator to resign from the military, and the 
non-financial value placed on continued service.  He utilized the Annualized Cost of 
Living Technique, developed in 1981 by Warner (1981).  Using a Cost of Leaving (COL) 
factor, this technique quantifies one’s “taste” for military service with a dollar amount 
associated with leaving. 
Mills looked at years that marked significant career decision milestones for 
aviators under the ACCP, which were  9, 11, 16, and 21 years of commissioned service.  
It was determined whether each aviator decided to stay or leave at this point, leading to a 
COL value.  The COL value plays a similar role to that of the ACCP, as a monetary value 
to the aviator who chooses to stay.  At each milestone, if the aviator decided to stay and 
the ACCP was received, the COL was increased, indicating increased retention 
likelihood.  Mills found that the COL amount was statistically significant in determining 




yielded increases of 19.68 percent in retention likelihood for 11 to 20 years, 
29.72 percent for 16 to 20 years, 13.9 percent for 16 to 25 years, and finally 8.86 percent 
for 21 to 25 years. 
As stated above, the ACOL is a useful model, but it fails to consider other factors 
in the decision-making process of a Naval Aviator.  Further, conversations with the 
Aviation Community Manager’s office at BUPERS have yielded the notion that aviators 
who choose to leave the Navy generally do so immediately following their initial service 
requirement.  This research factors in future uncertainty as well as “shock” in the 
decision-making process.  Also, the focus of this research centers on whether or not 
Naval Aviators leave the Navy, or just the aviation community, at their first opportunity. 
Another consideration is that the Mills study was conducted just prior to the 
change in the retention bonus for Naval Aviators.  It has been 12 years since the change 
in the bonus structure that took place in 2000, and much has happened in over a decade.  
Wars have broken out, the economy has fluctuated, and the airline industry has 
experienced major setbacks since September 11, 2001.  When these factors are 
considered, it gives credence to the notion that an up-to-date analysis of aviator retention 
is required. 
D. SURFARE WARFARE OFFICERS AND THE SURFACE WARFARE 
OFFICER CONTINUATION PAY (SWOCP) 
Lorio (2006) evaluated the impact of the Surface Warfare Officer Continuation 
Pay on the impact of retaining Surface Warfare Officers (SWO) beyond their initial 
service obligations to complete two Department Head (DH) tours afloat.  DH manning 
has long been an issue in the Navy, with the failure to retain enough Surface Warfare 
Officers to fill these billets (Hoewing, 2004).  Because of manning shortfalls, SWOCP 
was established in 2000 as a mechanism to increase retention of SWOs, reduce the 
number of manning shortfalls, and to maintain higher-quality officers within the Surface 
Warfare community. 
The goal of Lorio’s research was to measure the extent to which higher-quality 
officers were being retained when compared to other officers in the Surface Warfare 
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Community.  Lorio created the Level of Officer Retention and Inventory Optimizer 
(LORIO) score to evaluate the performance of these junior officers.  This method takes 
into account the performance of the individual, as quantified through his or her Fitness 
Reports (FITREP).  It starts with an adjusted Member Trait Average (MTA), which is 
calculated based on the scores one receives in a FITREP, and then standardized to 
account for differences in Reporting Senior Cumulative Averages (RSCUMAVG), which 
is the manner in which reporting seniors rate their junior officers.  The standardized MTA 
is calculated as follows: 
MTAadjusted = (MTA – RSCUMAVG) / (5.0 – RSCUMAVG) 
Once the MTA is standardized, a time decay factor is included in the analysis to 
place increased weight on more recent FITREPs.  The final value for the LORIO score 
has a number between minus 1 and plus 1.  This outlines a possible method of separating 
the higher-quality Surface Warfare Officers from the rest of the group.   
As a result of her analyses, Lorio was able to determine that the LORIO score was 
no different for those officers who remained on active duty before or after SWOCP was 
implemented.  In other words, the Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay did not have 
any impact on retaining higher-quality officers.  She also determined that SWOCP did 
not significantly impact the level of future performance by an officer that had received 
the bonus.  SWOCP appears to retain quantity, without having a means to selectively 
target higher-quality officers.  Lorio determined that SWOCP should be used more 
selectively in the future to help retain the better performers.   
The above study demonstrates that there has been success in using newer 
techniques to evaluate the retention of another group of naval officers, specifically 
Surface Warfare Officers.  Lorio demonstrated the utility of a new approach to retention 
studies as long ago as 2006.  It is important to continue to study retention and associated 
bonuses, especially as budgets are tightened and services are forced to justify these 
bonuses.  The Lorio study shows that new techniques are possible, and for that reason it 
is crucial to explore new methods of assessing naval aviator retention.  This thesis 
presents yet another potential technique for evaluating retention. 
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III. AVIATION CAREER CONTINUATION PAY (ACCP) 
A. HISTORY 
In the 1970s, aviator retention in the United States Navy was of significant 
concern.  Historically, when the Navy has had retention shortfalls, the Navy has brought 
reservists onto active duty to supplement the force during times of need.  From 1971 to 
1972, it is estimated that 35 percent of pilots serving in the Navy were reservists brought 
onto active duty (Thie et al., 1995).  Activated reservists still comprised 13 percent of the 
aviator population in 1980 (Thie et al., 1995).  The Department of Defense and the 
Congress recognized this shortage, and in 1980 began to institute aviator bonuses.  Under 
U.S. Code Title 37, Section 301b, bonuses were authorized to alleviate shortages in flight 
personnel and to improve levels of retention.  Aviation Officers Continuation Pay was 
offered in fiscal years 1981–1982 and 1984–1988 to address the same concerns.  The 
Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) was then enacted by the Congress in fiscal year 1989 
as a replacement to the original Aviation Officers Continuation Pay.  The ACP was again 
authorized under the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 
(GAO, 1994). 
Under the new Aviation Continuation Pay program, each of the armed services 
was authorized to pay bonuses to its aviators, at a level of $12,000 per year, to those 
aviators that had completed at least six years but fewer than 13 years of active duty 
service.  The bonus program was not to extend beyond the 14th year of service.  With the 
exception of the U.S. Army, each of the United States Armed Services utilized the ACP 
program.  One noteworthy point is that while the Army agreed that they had shortfalls in 
aviator retention that could not be alleviated without the ACP program, it felt it was 
unfair to single out a group of officers for special treatment (GAO, 1994).   
The reality was that there were many concerns about the ACP beyond those 
expressed by the Army.  Namely, failure of pilots to fulfill their obligations was a 
concern associated with the ACP.  Under this program, pilots were obligated to serve 
through the 14th year of commissioned service.  However, many recipients of the ACP 
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were failing to meet this obligation.  In many cases, pilots were leaving the aviation 
community to convert to another officer specialty, or were experiencing circumstances 
that caused them to leave the Navy altogether, such as failing to be selected for O-4 or 
having an injury (Moore & Griffis, 1999). 
A second concern about the ACP program involved failure to fill billets other than 
the Department Head tour.  Prior to their Department Head tour, pilots are expected to fill 
a non-flying sea billet, known as the disassociated sea tour.  This billet was often difficult 
to fill, and because it occurred after the minimum service requirement, Navy personnel 
were concerned that high-quality pilots were being discouraged from staying in the Navy 
(Moore & Griffis, 1999). 
The numerous critiques about the Aviation Continuation Pay in the 1990s led to 
the commencement of the ACCP in fiscal year 2000.  During this period, the Navy was 
experiencing shortages of over 1000 pilots and NFOs throughout all career milestones.  
The purpose of this new bonus program was to provide incentive for high-quality, 
eligible aviators to choose the Navy as their enduring career choice.  Under U.S. Code 
Title 37, Section 301b, the Service Secretaries were now given the discretion to pay up to 
$25,000 per year for every year that a pilot or NFO remained on active duty following his 
or her minimum service requirement, and this bonus was available up until 25 years of 
commissioned aviation service had been reached (PERS-43, 2010). 
The Navy used this new authorization to specifically target Naval Aviators and 
Naval Flight Officers for sea duty and command billets.  From the initial year of the 
ACCP in 2000, the Navy chose to offer contracts of two to three years consisting of up to 
$15,000 for sea duty-assigned officers up through “post command” O-5 tours.  Yet the 
bigger issue was getting junior officers to remain in the aviation community following 
their minimum service requirement.  The ACCP program was modified after just several 
months of existence in fiscal year 2000 to allow a five-year contract option to aviators in 
year groups 1989 and later who were becoming eligible for a retention bonus for the first 
time.  Under the modified ACCP of 2000, the long-term contract offered $25,000 per 
year for eligible pilots of all platforms, and $15,000 per year for Naval Flight Officers.  
In an effort to further entice potential bonus takers, these junior aviators could choose to 
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receive half of the total amount up front as a lump sum.  The bonus was also extended 
beyond the limits of sea duty billets, whereby it was offered to those in designated 
command billets ashore or afloat, including O-6 aviators with less than 24 years of 
commissioned aviation service (PERS-43, 2010).  
In 2001, the Navy ACCP remained the same as the modified ACCP that was 
introduced in July of 2000. The 2002 ACCP program replicated the 2001 program but 
with one notable exception.  In 2002, the Navy introduced the one-year early payment 
option for aviators nearing the end of their minimum service requirement.  The FY-2002 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Section 301b(b) 4 of Title 37, U.S. Code, 
was changed and now the services had the option to pay the ACCP bonus one year before 
the end of the minimum service requirement.  This change was critical, creating a 
noteworthy financial incentive during the time that a pilot or NFO was deciding whether 
or not to remain in the aviation community (PERS-43, 2010). 
No changes to the program were made in 2003, and fiscal year 2004 was an 
extension of this, with one significant change.  Lump sum payments of the bonus were 
now contingent upon successful screening (selection) for Department Head by the 
Aviation Department Head Screen Board.  Therefore, an aviator reaching the end of the 
minimum service requirement could not receive his or her lump sum bonus payment until 
he or she had been found eligible for service as a Department Head (PERS-43, 2010). 
The fiscal year 2005 ACCP program included two changes from fiscal year 2004.  
While there had been a three-year contract option at one time for junior officers following 
the minimum service requirement, this was no longer an option.  The three-year contract 
was discontinued, and the five-year contract was all that remained for aviators at this 
career milestone.  The purpose was to ensure that any aviator that took the bonus would 
remain in the naval aviation community through his or her respective Aviation 
Department Head Screen Board. This was also the first year where aviators completed a 
second screening on the Aviation Department Head Screen Board after failing to select 




pilots and NFOs that had not screened for Department Head.  Because of this, the United 
States Navy saved $1.8 million due to the termination of 67 contracts that occurred under 
this new policy (PERS-43, 2010). 
While the fiscal year 2005 program was characterized by PERS-43 as “highly 
successful,” the fiscal year 2006 program saw two changes that were targeted specifically 
at Naval Flight Officers.  First, the long-term bonus for NFOs was increased from 
$15,000 to $25,000 per year.  Second, the short-term bonus options were separated into 
three different categories: sea duty, command, and astronaut, with all short-term bonuses 
still paying $15,000 per year.  There were three reasons for these changes: (1) to make 
the ACCP more appealing to more NFOs; (2) to reverse trends in retention of NFOs; and 
(3) to simplify the various short-term bonus options into just three categories.   
Additionally, the 2005 policy, under which the Navy would no longer pay long-term 
bonuses to aviators who failed to select for Department Head, continued.  For fiscal year 
2006, this policy led to savings of $1.9 million following the termination of 61 contracts 
affected by the policy (PERS-43, 2010). 
The implementation of the ACCP program for fiscal year 2006 continued into 
fiscal years 2007 and 2008.  In 2008, there were a few noteworthy changes in the criteria 
of eligibility for the bonus.  Aviation-designated astronauts were no longer eligible for 
the ACCP program.  However, Aviation Engineering Duty Officers (AEDO) were now 
eligible for the bonus if a screening board had selected them for Commander and Major 
Command.  Payment rates continued to be $15,000 for three-year (short-term) contracts, 
and $25,000 per year for five-year (long-term) contracts.  The fiscal year 2008 program 
also clarified eligibility for the bonus with regards to the Department Head requirement 
for junior officers.  Under this program, an aviator was not eligible for the ACCP bonus if 
(1) he or she failed to screen for a Department Head tour on two separate selection 
boards; (2) he or she declined to be considered by the Aviation Department Head Screen 
Board; or (3) the aviator declined orders to an aviation Department Head tour after 
successfully being selected for a Department Head tour.  Under scenario (1) where an 
aviator failed to select, he or she would receive no future installments of the bonus, while 
those installments already received were the property of the aviator.  Under scenarios (2) 
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and (3), all bonus funds received by the aviator were to be returned, and no future 
installments of the bonus would be received.  Because of this change, 39 aviators did not 
receive orders to a Department Head billet in fiscal year 2008.  Their contracts were 
subsequently terminated, and the Navy saved in excess of $1.69 million for fiscal year 
2008 and also in future payments (PERS-43, 2010). 
A few changes were then incorporated into the 2009 program, though the program 
mostly mirrored the implementation of the fiscal year 2008 program.  In fiscal year 2009, 
eligibility for the astronaut bonus was reinstated, and eligibility of Aerospace 
Engineering Duty Officers to receive the short-term command bonus was discontinued.  
It was determined that while an AEDO qualified for the Aviation Career Incentive Pay, 
commonly known as “flight pay,” they should not be included in an incentive program 
targeted at pilots and Naval Flight Officers (PERS-43, 2010).  Put simply, the changes 
that were instituted for fiscal year 2008 were reversed for fiscal year 2009. 
The fiscal year 2010 program was modified to reflect earlier program 
characteristics of the ACCP.  The annual rate of the five-year contract for Naval Flight 
Officers was reduced from $25,000 back to $15,000.  All other characteristics of the 
fiscal year 2009 program remained in effect. 
Table 1 summarizes the bonus amounts for fiscal years 2011 and 2012.  For fiscal 
year 2011, bonus amounts were drastically reduced for pilots, a first-time development in 
the history of the current ACCP bonus system.  This trend of changing amounts 

















Table 1.   Aviator Bonus Amounts for Fiscal Years 2011 and 2012 
In 2012, the bonus amounts remain substantially less than in the past for some 
groups of Naval Aviators and Naval Flight Officers.  The bonuses have been subject to 
drastic change in the past two fiscal years, where they not only are based on being a pilot 
or NFO, but are based on the type of aircraft as well.  This is an interesting development, 
because an early criticism of the old ACP system was that the varied bonus amounts were 
unfair and negatively impacted the morale of those who were to receive less. 
B. ELIGIBILITY 
OPNAVINST 7220.9 outlines several criteria to determine whether a pilot in the 
Navy is eligible for the ACCP.  An aviator is eligible for this bonus when all of the 
following are met.  He or she must: 
1) Be entitled to ACIP (Aviation Career Incentive Pay; also known as “flight 
pay”). 
2) Be serving in a billet designated by COMNAVPERSCOM (PERS-43). 
3) Be in a paygrade O-6 or below. 
4) Be qualified to perform operational flying duty. 
5) Have completed any Aviation Active Duty Service Obligation incurred for 
undergraduate aviator training leading to designation as a naval aviator or 
is within 1 year of completing such commitment.   
6) Have completed less than 24 years of aviation service. 
7) Be recommended for receipt of ACCP by their commanding officer. 
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C. RELEVANCE TO THIS STUDY 
Naval Aviators are a highly important component of national defense, and a 
shortage of pilots could present negative implications, especially in time of war.  Because 
aviators are at greater risk of leaving the aviation community at the conclusion of their 
minimum service requirement than at any other time in a 20-year career, this study 
specifically focuses on the “long-term” bonus paid to Naval Aviators.  This is a five-year 
contract, under such an aviator will receive between $5,000 and $25,000 per year for five 
years to serve in department head billets.  Further, the initial payment for the long-term 
bonus may be authorized for receipt one year prior to the end of the minimum service 
requirement.  In total, an eligible aviator who accepts the long-term bonus over five years 
will receive between $25,000 and $125,000 depending on the type of aircraft flown and 
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IV. DATA AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A. RATIONALE 
This thesis describes the administration of the ACCP program since its inception 
in fiscal year 2000, and the effect on retention rates within the aviation community of the 
United States Navy.  Personnel data that comprise the independent variables for the study 
include commissioning source, length of initial service obligation, sex, race, and rank at 
each year starting with the year prior to the minimum service requirement through the 
fifth year following the MSR. 
The dependent variable is the career outcome for the individual pilot: whether he 
or she decides to remain in the military.  Besides the independent variables listed above, 
the DRM includes economic data.  Average pay by year of service for military pilots is 
included for fiscal years 1996 through 2001.  Civilian pay statistics come from the 
Current Population Survey for 1996 through 2001.  
The DRM is comprised of five equations with regards to a retention decision, and 
all five factor into the aviator’s decision to remain or leave.  The first three equations give 
a predicted value of staying for a specific period of time.  One equation represents the 
expected value of staying in the Navy’s aviation community for one additional year; the 
second equation represents the expected value of staying in the aviation community for 
five additional years;  and the third equation represents the value of staying for a 20-year 
career.  The last two equations deal with the probability of staying.  The first of these 
equations is the probability of staying in the Navy, and the second equation is the 
probability of leaving.  If the pilot achieves a highest expected value from signing a five-
year contract, the model assumes that the pilot will choose to stay. 
B. DATA DESCRIPTION 
Prior to obtaining data, a thorough review of the study was conducted by the 
Naval Postgraduate School Institutional Review Board.  Data was obtained from the 
Navy Personnel Command, Aviation Officer Community Manager.  Data was also 
obtained through aviation detailers, PERS-43.  The data originated from fiscal years 1997 
 18
through 2011, and consisted of all officers detailed to the aviation community.  Not 
limited to Naval Aviators and Naval Flight Officers, this data included all officers such as 
flight surgeons, nurses, chaplains, intelligence officers, and those who had previously 
served as Naval Aviators and Naval Flight Officers.  Each fiscal year included over 
50,000 personnel records, for a grand total of 801,132 records.  For each of these officers, 
dozens of data elements were provided.  These elements included such items as the 
officer’s name, social security number, designator (a four-digit number indicating the 
officer’s job specialty), year group (fiscal year in which the officer was commissioned), 
sex, race, ethnic group, active duty start date, rank, date of rank, commissioning source 
(for example, the United States Naval Academy, Officer Candidate School, NROTC), 
platform (aircraft flown), and dependent status. 
Additional data sets were provided to determine retention decisions.  One data set 
in particular listed all Naval Aviators and all Naval Flight Officers who had accepted the 
ACCP bonus.  This data covered retention decisions made by bonus takers in fiscal years 
2003 through 2011.  A third data set containing aviation strength losses was provided as 
well.  This data set displayed the year of departure and the reason for the departure of 
every Naval Aviator and Naval Flight Officer during each year from 1997 through 2011.  
Some of the common reasons for departure included resignation from the Navy, 
conversion to another job in the Navy, retirement, administrative separation (ADSEP), 
and “other”.  
Using personally identifiable information, the three data sets were compared to 
determine the final disposition for each Naval Aviator, or whether he or she remained in 
the Navy’s aviation community.  The dataset was reduced to a smaller dataset to include 
pilots only, as this thesis seeks to answer questions about their retention as affected by the 
ACCP.  These pilots consisted only of those that were commissioned in fiscal years 1996 
through 2001.  The base year of 1996 was chosen because this cohort of pilots would 
have only been eligible for a retention bonus through the system that was introduced in 
the year 2000, whereas earlier year groups may have been eligible for the older bonus 
system, or possibly a choice of either bonus.  The final year group of 2001 was chosen 
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because this year group was the most recent year group that would have entirely reached 
the point of choosing whether or not to remain in the Navy’s aviation community.   
Of significant note is that for each year group, there were a number of pilots for 
whom no final disposition information was available (approximately 15 percent).  That is, 
there was no indication that he or she had chosen to stay as indicated by accepting the 
ACCP bonus.  Likewise, there was no information to indicate that the individual had left 
the aviation community or left the Navy.  These individuals were removed from the final 
data set.  What remained as the group to be analyzed included Naval Aviators for which 
there was data available for each year that he or she remained in the Navy, with data up 
through the sixth year after the minimum service requirement, or the year 2011, 
whichever came first. 
Another point of interest is that the data set used in the analysis included only 
those pilots who had stayed in long enough to reach their MSR.  Since this thesis seeks to 
investigate decision-making in retention decisions, it was important to include only the 
Naval Aviators who had reached a point where they were eligible to make retention 
decisions.  Those who had left the Navy or the aviation community earlier in their career 
for any reason were excluded.  At the end of the data filtering process, 3,041 pilots 
remained.  At least eight years of data were included for each of these pilots, with over 
24,000 points of data utilized to analyze this population.   
By the time the final data set was created, all personally identifiable information 
had been removed, and each pilot had been assigned a 6-digit identification number.  The 
first two digits indicate the fiscal year in which the pilot received his or her commission, 
and the last four digits were randomly assigned.  In keeping the data format designed by 
the RAND Corporation for use with the DRM, the final data set also consisted of 
commissioning source, length of the initial service obligation, final disposition (stay or 
leave), sex, and race (black or other).   
Commissioning Source.  The Commissioning Source (source) was coded with a 
number, either “1,” “2,” or “3.”  A “1” indicated that the pilot attended a service 
academy, that is, the United States Naval Academy, the United States Air Force 
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Academy, the United States Military Academy, or one of the various maritime academies 
located in the United States.  A “2” indicated that a pilot had received a commission 
through a Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps program at a civilian university.  
Finally, a “3” indicated that the officer was commissioned through any other source, 
including Officer Candidate School. 
Length of Initial Service Obligation (liso). The liso was indicated by a numeric 
value indicating a number of years.  A pilot’s minimum service requirement is 
determined by a pre-established requirement corresponding to the platform flown by the 
pilot.  Up until the 2001 year group, a helicopter pilot was generally obliged to serve 
seven years following “winging,” or completion of flight training culminating in the 
receipt of the Naval Aviator wings of gold warfare pin.  The pilot of a jet or propeller-
driven plane was obliged to serve eight years following winging.  The minimum service 
requirement is therefore variable and dependent on many factors, which may include the 
time it takes an officer to master his or her skills as a pilot, or down time spent between 
the date of commissioning and the start of flight school. 
The final disposition (final) of the pilot was indicated by the word “Stay” or 
“Leave,” where “Stay” indicated that he or she had accepted the ACCP bonus.  Sex of an 
aviator (sex) was indicated by a value of “0” or “1,” where a “0” indicated a male and a 
“1” indicated a female.  Finally, the race of the aviator (black) was also indicated by a 
value of “0” or “1.”  A “0” indicated that the pilot was identified as any race except 
black, whereas a value of “1” indicated a black aviator.  
Each pilot’s rank was recorded over a seven year period, including in the year 
prior to the year of minimum service requirement (y0), followed by rank in the year of 
the MSR, and rank in each of the five years following the MSR (y1 through y6).  For 
each year, the rank is indicated by an “s” followed by a 3-digit number.  The first digit in 
the number indicated the officer’s rank, while the last two numbers indicate the years of 
service that it took for the pilot to reach that rank.  For example, a value of “s304” 




after four years of commissioned service.  Likewise, a value of “s410” indicated that the 
pilot held the rank of O-4, which was attained following 10 years of commissioned 
service. 
C. MODEL DEVELOPMENT  
The Air Force study documented by Mattock and Arkes (2007) covers several 
different options with regards to the impact of the aviation bonus on retention decisions 
of pilots.  For the purposes of this study, the option of the five-year commitment was the 
only one evaluated.  Options beyond this point are of less interest since an officer who 
has stayed in the aviation community until the 15 year point is likely to stay until 
retirement, regardless of bonuses. 
Simple retention models do not work well in the real world.  They assume that 
people who share similar characteristics will behave the same way under similar 
circumstances.  Yet the real world does not operate in this manner.  There are factors of 
uncertainty that make a difference in retention decisions, and one of these factors is a 
taste for military service.  That is, how much does he or she like being in the military?  
Second, there are positive and negative shocks that factor into decision making.  With 
regards to staying in the military, a positive shock may be an early promotion or a 
monetary bonus.  A negative shock may be an unexpected deployment or a “less-than-
desirable” job assignment.  In other words, a positive shock will reinforce the desire for 
an officer to remain a pilot in the Navy, whereas a negative shock may cause him or her 
to lose desire for remaining in this position.  This is where the DRM exposes its 
relevance.     
A five-year commitment is modeled by using five equations in accordance with 
the DRM.  As previously stated in Chapter IV, A., this includes a “stay” equation for 
remaining in the aviation community for one additional year.  The second equation is a 
“stay” equation for remaining in the aviation community for five additional years.  The 
third equation is a “stay” equation for remaining in the aviation community until 20 years 
of commissioned service.  The fourth and fifth equations are probability equations, with 
the fourth being the probability of staying, and the fifth being the probability of leaving. 
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In this section, we restate the model of Mattock and Arkes (2007).  The first 
“stay” equation for the nonstochastic value of remaining in the aviation community one 
year is as follows: 
௧ܸௌଵ ൌ ߛ ൅ ௧ܹ௠ ൅ ߚ	ܧ௧ሾܯܽݔሺ ௧ܸାଵ௅ , ௧ܸାଵௌଵ , ௧ܸାଵௌହ , ௧ܸାଵௌଶ଴ሻሿ 
where: 
௧ܸௌଵ is the value of staying in the aviation community for one year, 
ߛ is the individual taste for military service, 
Wt
m is military earnings in a given year, which includes retirement benefits that 
will accrue for staying until t, and 
ߚ	ܧ௧ሾܯܽݔሺ ௧ܸାଵ௅ , ௧ܸାଵௌଵ , ௧ܸାଵௌହ , ௧ܸାଵௌଶ଴ሻሿis the discounted expected value of leaving, 
remaining in the aviation community for one year, remaining for five years, or remaining 
for 20 years, where: 
   is the annual discount rate, and 
  ܧ௧is the random shock. 
The second “stay” equation for the nonstochastic value of remaining in the 




ሺߛ ൅ ఛܹ௠ହሻ ൅ ߚହܧ௧ሾܯܽݔሺ ௧ܸାଵ௅ , ௧ܸାଵௌଵ , ௧ܸାଵௌହ , ௧ܸାଵௌଶ଴ሻሿ 
where: 
Vt
S5is the monetary value of the five-year contract, 
t
 t
t4 ( m Wm5 ) is the discounted present value of military earnings, which 
includes the bonus for the five-year contract, 
ߚହܧ௧ሾܯܽݔሺ ௧ܸାଵ௅ , ௧ܸାଵௌଵ , ௧ܸାଵௌହ , ௧ܸାଵௌଶ଴ሻሿ is the discounted expected value of leaving, 
remaining in the aviation community for one year, remaining for five years, or remaining 
for 20 years, where: 
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   is the annual discount rate, and 
  ܧ௧is the random shock. 
The third “stay” equation for the nonstochastic value of remaining in the aviation 




൫ߛ ൅ ఛܹ௠ଶ଴,௧൯ ൅	ߚଶ଴ି௧ܧ௧ሾܯܽݔሺ ଶܸ଴௅ , ଶܸ଴ௌଵ, ଶܸ଴ௌହሻሿ 
where: 
 ௧ܸௌଶ଴ is the monetary value of staying in the Navy for 20 years,  
 ∑ ߚఛି௧ଵଽఛୀଵ ൫ߛ ൅ ఛܹ௠ଶ଴,௧൯	is the discounted present value of military earnings 
through 20 years of service,  
 ߚଶ଴ି௧ܧ௧ሾܯܽݔሺ ଶܸ଴௅ , ଶܸ଴ௌଵ, ଶܸ଴ௌହሻሿ	is the discounted expected value of leaving, 
remaining in the aviation community for one year, or remaining in the aviation 
community for five years, where: 
 ߚଶ଴ି௧	is	the	annual	discount	rate	for	20	years	of	service, and 
 ܧ௧	is	the	random	shock.  
  
The probability of staying equation is as follows:   
Prሾܵݐܽݕ௧|ߛ, ߪሿ ൌ Prሾܯܽݔሺ ௧ܸௌଵ, ௧ܸௌହ, ௧ܸௌଶ଴ሻ െ ௧ܸ௅ ൐ ߝ௧ሿ ൌ ܨሺܯܽݔ
ሺ ௧ܸௌଵ, ௧ܸௌହ, ௧ܸௌଶ଴ሻ െ ௧ܸ௅
ߪ ሻ 
where: 
 Prሾܯܽݔሺ ௧ܸௌଵ, ௧ܸௌହ, ௧ܸௌଶ଴ሻ െ ௧ܸ௅ ൐ ߝ௧ሿ	is the probability that the maximum value of 
staying for one year, five years, or 20 years exceeds the value of random shock. 
 
The probability of leaving equation is as follows:   
 
Prሾܮ݁ܽݒ݁௧|ߛ, ߪሿ ൌ 1 െ Prሾܵݐܽݕ௧ |ߛ, ߪሿ 
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V. ANALYSIS RESULTS 
A. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
A total of 3,041 pilots are represented in the dataset used in this study. Of this 
3,041, 1,516 pilots accepted the ACCP bonus (49.8%).  This is broken down by year 









Table 2.   Number of Pilots Accepting ACCP Bonus 
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Out of the total 3,041 pilots in the study, 177 (5.8%) were female.  Year group 
2001 had the highest percentage of female pilots, with a population that was 7.0% 
female, while year group 1996 had the lowest percentage, with a population that was 
3.9% female.  Only 29 females in the study chose to accept the ACCP, accounting for 
16.3% of female pilots in the population, and comprising 1.9% of the overall population 
of bonus takers. 
 




1996  20  3.9%  3  15.0%  1.2% 
1997  27  5.2%  6  22.2%  2.5% 
1998  30  6.0%  5  16.7%  2.0% 
1999  28  5.9%  4  14.3%  1.9% 
2000  36  6.9%  7  19.4%  2.6% 
2001  36  7.0%  4  11.1%  1.3% 
Total  177  5.8%  29  16.3%  1.9% 
 
Table 3.   Number of Female Pilots by Year Group 
 










1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Year Group
 27
The entire population of pilots consisted of 92 black pilots, or 3% of the 
population.  Year group 1998 had the highest percentage of black pilots, with 3.9% of the 
population consisting of black pilots, while smallest percentage was in year group 2000, 
with 2.1%.  Fifty-four black pilots chose to accept the ACCP bonus, consisting of 58.7% 
of the population of black pilots, and 3.6% of the overall population of bonus takers.  One 
noteworthy observation was that there were no black female pilots found in the 
population used for this study. 
 




1996  18  3.5%  10  55.6%  4.1% 
1997  16  3.1%  8  50.0%  3.3% 
1998  20  3.9%  11  55.0%  4.5% 
1999  15  3.2%  11  73.3%  5.1% 
2000  11  2.1%  5  45.5%  1.8% 
2001  12  2.3%  9  75.0%  3.0% 
Total  92  3.0%  54  58.7%  3.6% 
 





Figure 3.   Percentage of Black Pilots by Year Group 
A slight majority of pilots were commissioned through Officer Candidate School 
or any other commissioning program, those not including NROTC or service academies.  
A total of 1140 pilots were commissioned in this group, comprising 37.5% of the entire 
population.  Service academies accounted for the second-largest commissioning source, 
with 1128 pilots comprising 37.1% of the population.  Those commissioned through 






















Figure 4.   Percentage of Pilots Commissioned by Each Source 
Source 3, consisting of all commissioning sources except for service academies 
and NROTC programs, had the highest percentage of bonus takers.  Approximately 
51.7% of this group accepted the long-term ACCP bonus.  Source 1, consisting of service 
academy graduates, closely followed with 49.8% of the population choosing to accept the 
bonus.  Finally, 47.2% of NROTC graduates comprising Group 2 chose to remain in the 

























Figure 5.   Percentage of Bonus Takers by Commissioning Source 
The data was further subdivided by aircraft platform, or type of aircraft flown by 
a given pilot.  The categories included “helo” for helicopter pilots, “jet” for pilots of jet-
propelled aircraft, and “prop” for pilots of propeller-driven aircraft.  There were a total of 
1285 helicopter pilots, 908 jet pilots, and 848 prop pilots represented in the study.  
Helicopter pilots had the second-highest percentage of bonus takers, with 54.5% 
accepting the bonus.  Jet pilots had the highest percentage of bonus takers, with 
approximately 55% of pilots accepting the ACCP bonus and remaining in the aviation 
community after their minimum service requirement had ended. Pilots flying propeller-

























Figure 6.   Percentage of Bonus Takers by Aircraft Platform 
The average minimum service requirement for the population was 9.36 years from 
the date of commissioning.  The mode for the MSR was nine years, while the maximum 
MSR was 15 years (N = 2).  While this is lengthy, a pilot with such an MSR most likely 
started in another community and converted to be a pilot later in their career as a naval 
officer.  The minimum MSR was seven years (N = 4).  This was very uncommon, with 
only four occurrences, all of which fell into source category “3.”  It is likely that these 
pilots had begun their career in another service (i.e., Air Force, Marine Corps) and were 
under a shorter contract when they transferred to the Navy.   
It is not surprising that the shortest average minimum service requirement was 
found among the population of helicopter pilots.  This is because with an MSR of 7 years 
following winging, the average length of initial service requirement was 8.99 years.  For 
jet pilots, the average length of initial service requirement was 10.18 years.  Finally, prop 

















Figure 7.   Average Length of Initial Service Obligation by Aircraft Platform 
B. IMPLEMENTING THE DRM: THE IMPACT OF THE ACCP 
RETENTION BONUS 
Computations were made via the statistical program R, using R code developed 
by Mattock and Arkes (2007).  An additional function was created that would specifically 
call the function “PrStay” from the RAND model.  This function takes three inputs: 
gamma, sigma, and beta.  Gamma is used to model the taste of military service for an 
individual and uses an extreme value distribution.  A random Weibull distribution was 
utilized to generate the gamma parameter, using the scale of 221.4 that was given in the 
RAND report.  Sigma is used to simulate the potential shock that each pilot would 
experience.  The model takes the standard deviation of shock, which was given in the 
RAND report as 566.8.  Finally, beta is the annual discount rate.  RAND used a value of 
0.9 and this was maintained in the attempt to validate their DRM as implemented in R. 
Each pilot in the dataset was entered into the model in a manner that would take 
his or her initial service obligation and input it as “t” (time).  In other words, this program 
was used to simulate each pilot’s most likely retention decision at the time of completing 



























Table 8.   Predicted Rate of Bonus Takers by Bonus Amounts 
As displayed in Table 8, 75.2% of pilots were predicted to sign a five-year 
contract when a bonus of $25,000 per year was offered.  This is in contrast to what was 
observed in the actual data, where approximately 50% of pilots accepted the bonus (Table 
2).  When the bonus was lowered to $15,000 per year, approximately 64.4% of pilots 
were predicted to sign a five-year contract to remain in the Navy as a pilot.  With a bonus 
of $5,000 per year, the predicted rate of bonus takers is lowered to 50.6%.  Finally, with 
the removal of the bonus altogether, only 14 pilots (0.5%) were predicted to sign a five-
year contract.  This finding is suspect and highly unlikely.  Even in the absence of the 
bonus, there will be individuals who enjoy their job in the Navy and are committed to 
serving until retirement age.   
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C. MODELING THROUGH LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
Because the DRM did not appear to be successful in predicting retention, a 
logistic regression was initiated using the same data.  The dependent variable (final) was 
defined as whether or not each aviator had taken the bonus, as indicated by “stay” or 
“leave.”  Independent variables were commissioning source (source), race, sex, length of 
initial service obligation, and rank at the time the initial service obligation had been 
completed.   
In order to simplify the model and mitigate the impact of outliers, some of these 
variables were collapsed further into factors for the model.  Race (black) and sex were 
combined into “RaceSex,” with “BM” denoting a black male, “WF” denoting a non-black 
female, and “WM” denoting a non-black male.  Length of initial service obligation (liso) 
was combined into four possible categories, with “8-” denoting an obligation of eight or 
fewer years, “9” denoting nine years, “10” denoting 10 years, and “11+” denoting 11 or 
more years.  Finally, rank at the conclusion of service obligation (rank) was collapsed 
into factors of “O3” for an O-3, and “O4+” for an officer who was an O-4 or senior. 
A logistic multiple regression was run with all of the above factors, as displayed 
in Table 9 (Devore, 2010).  Source did not appear to be a significant factor in predicting a 
decision to stay or leave, and it was removed from the model.  When the logistic 
regression was run again, RaceSex was found to be significant with a p-value of 0.  
Specifically, non-black females are highly likely to leave naval aviation, with an 
estimated coefficient (log odds) of minus 1.84 and a p-value of 0.  The odds of a non-
black female staying in the Navy are only 16% of that for a comparable non-black male.   
Coefficient  ࢼ෡ Exp ൫ࢼ෡൯   SE ൫ࢼ෡൯ p-value 
 RaceSex BM 0.34 1.40  0.22  0.13 
RaceSex WF       –1.84        0.16  0.22  0.00 
 Liso9 0.15  1.16   0.13  0.27 
 Liso10      –2.01        0.13  0.24  0.00 
 Liso11+      –2.29        0.10  0.27  0.00 
 rankO4+ 3.07 21.54   0.22  0.00 
 
Table 9.   Multiple Regression Results 
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Length of initial service obligation was found to be significant at a p-value of 0.  
Those with a length of initial service of 10 or more years are likely to leave naval 
aviation.  Log odds were minus 2.01 for factor “10” and minus 2.29 for factor “11+.”  
The odds of staying for a pilot with a 10-year initial service obligation are 13.4% of the 
odds for a comparable pilot with a service obligation of eight or fewer years.   The odds 
of staying for a pilot with a service obligation of 11 or more years are 10.1% of the odds 
for a comparable pilot with a service obligation of eight or fewer years.    
Finally, rank was found to be significant at an alpha-level of 0.  Those of rank O-4 
or senior (O4+) were likely to remain in the Navy as pilots, with log odds of 3.07 and a p-
value of 0.  The odds of a pilot with rank O-4 staying in the Navy are 21.54 times greater 
than the odds of an O-3 staying in the Navy (1 to 21.54).  This makes sense, as an O-4 or 
above will have already served for at least 10 years. 
The logistic regression was also used to calculate the predicted probability of 
staying in the naval aviation community for each set of characteristics.  Table 10 displays 
predicted probabilities of staying, and the corresponding frequency of pilots sharing that 
probability.  In terms of retention, 889 pilots had a greater than 50% predicted probability 
of staying, and 620 pilots in this group actually took the ACCP.   
The predicted probabilities are grouped as seen here because the model only 
produces 54 distinct predictions, corresponding to the 36 distinct combinations of 












< .467  497  159  24.2%  25.1% 
.467 ‐ .487  216  182  45.7%  46.7% 
.487 ‐ .497  249  258  50.9%  48.8% 
.497 ‐ .5  298  294  49.7%  49.7% 
.5+  269  620  69.7%  69.8% 
 
Table 10.   Predicted Probabilities of Retention 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
To answer the question about the impact of the ACCP on retention, the DRM did 
predict a downward trend of retention as the annual bonus was reduced.  While this 
model may be useful for looking at potential trends in changing bonus amounts for Naval 
Aviators, the results do not conclusively demonstrate the utility of this model.  First, the 
model did not produce an accurate number of bonus takers when the annual bonus was 
$25,000.  Though bonus amounts have fluctuated in recent years, all of the pilots in this 
study had the opportunity of signing a five-year contract when the only possible bonus 
amount was $25,000 per year.  The model predicted a retention rate of 75.2%, while the 
actual data showed that approximately 50% of the population had actually taken the 
bonus.  The model predicted 50% more signers of a five-year contract, which is a 
substantial difference. 
Second, the model predicted that only 14 officers (0.46%) would remain in the 
Navy as pilots if the bonus were to be discontinued.  These results are highly implausible 
and vastly underestimate the taste for military service that one may have.  While this 
model attempts to quantify a person’s preference for the military, it is not easy to put a 
dollar amount on levels of being patriotic and passion one may have for his or her job.  
The idea that no pilots would stay in the service without a bonus is unrealistic. 
The DRM failed to take into account the demographics of a population.  While 
the dataset calls for several elements, including commissioning source, length of initial 
service obligation, final disposition (stay or leave), sex, race, and promotion history, 
reading the R code revealed that the only element actually used to predict retention is the 
length of initial service obligation.  All other elements are disregarded.  It is unlikely that 
these other elements do not factor into a retention decision, and basing a decision to stay 
or leave solely on the length of initial service obligation is unrealistic. 
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The logistic regression appeared to create significantly better predictive results.  A 
review of the logistic regression results produces the conclusion that demographics are 
important when considering the issue of retention decisions.  Race, sex, length of initial 
service, and rank at the time of the retention decision are all associated with whether a 
pilot will remain in naval aviation.  Perhaps a more successful model would include these 
demographics, in addition to the economic factors considered in the DRM.  This may 
help to produce a more complete picture of pilot retention decisions. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The DRM presents another way of analyzing past retention and using it to make 
recommendations about future behavior.  By reducing the possible annual bonus 
amounts, the model may be used to look at the decreasing trend in aviator retention.  Yet 
the accuracy of simulated retention decisions is in question.  This model may be a starting 
point for calculating potential retention decisions, but it leaves unanswered questions 
about the actual number of aviators that can be expected to remain in the Navy.  Perhaps 
this model can be further developed and built upon in a manner that would be of more 
utility to the United States Navy.  Until the DRM is appropriately modified, the logistic 
regression is a better method for predicting retention 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Ask Aviators Why They Leave 
With regard to future research, the primary question that was identified is “why 
do aviators leave the Navy?”  It would be beneficial to ask aviators themselves why they 
chose to leave, or why they chose to take the bonus and continue their service.  This 
could be done through surveys or interviews with aviators in the U.S. Navy.  This would 
certainly give qualitative data as to whether the ACCP influences one to stay in the Navy. 
An example of an area where this would be of great utility would be with female 
aviators.  It was observed in the data that the vast majority of female aviators chose to 




requirement had been reached.  It is possible that this is a point when many female 
aviators are ready to start a family.  There is a question about whether the aviation 
community is conducive to motherhood. 
Another area of interest is that of operational tempo.  The United States has been 
at war since 2001, and all aviators in this study have been in the Navy during a conflict 
period.  It is likely that most of these aviators have deployed to conflict zones, and 
potentially deployed on many occasions.  As a result of conversations with Navy pilots, 
perhaps there is a level of “burnout” associated with these multiple deployments, and a 
desire to have a more steady and predictable work schedule.  This desire alone could be 
motivation to leave naval aviation.  By addressing these and related issues, one can better 
understand the factors involved in the decision-making process of whether or not to leave 
the aviation community. 
2. Evaluate Economic Factors 
A study of economic factors would also be of value.  There are countless 
economic factors to be considered that could influence a decision to stay or not, and 
conversations with aviators have yielded many factors of particular interest.  The housing 
market was a concern that has been cited by not just Naval Aviators, but service members 
as a whole.  Many members of the Navy have purchased homes in high-cost, fleet 
concentration areas, only to be saddled with the burden of being unable to sell these 
homes at a price that would cover the amount owed on the mortgage when PCS orders 
arrive.  The uncertainty of covering this cost could influence one’s decision to stay in the 
Navy.  To look at this, a researcher could find a way to quantify the nature of the housing 
market in the years leading up to the minimum service requirement of the service 
member.  Analysis could then examine the correlation between this factor and retention. 
The availability of commercial pilot jobs should be considered, instead of 
focusing on average salaries as a factor that is relevant to the retention decision.  
Regardless of starting salary, it is likely that aviators would be impacted by the 
availability of commercial aviation jobs.  A potential area of research could be to 
evaluate unemployment rates of trained pilots, or to research the demand for these jobs 
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versus the supply of qualified pilots.  The Naval Aviation community could use these 
results to their benefit, increasing the bonus in years of high job availability, and reducing 
the bonus in years in which an aviator is less likely to leave to pursue a commercial 
aviation career due to lack of opportunity.  This could be analyzed for aviators of 
different platforms to determine how bonus amounts should vary depending on platform 
and the availability of comparable civilian jobs. 
3. Evaluate Aviator Service Records 
A valuable addition to this body of research would be specific information on 
why an aviator potentially left on an involuntary basis.  While the information on each 
aviator used in this research was extensive and adequate for these purposes, the 
information on losses was often limited to such categories as “ADSEP” (Administrative 
Separation), “Resignation,” “Retirement,” and others. 
But what do these categories really mean?  And if the connotation is negative, 
would a researcher have success in gaining this information through surveys and 
interviews?  This research basically assumed that if an aviator made it to the end of his or 
her minimum service requirement, then he or she made the choice to stay or leave the 
Navy or the aviation community.  Yet there are myriad reasons why one may leave 
without really wanting to.  Perhaps an aviator who left due to medical reasons may have 
remained on active duty if he or she had remained healthy.  Another aviator may have 
been forced to leave due to disciplinary action.   
It would be beneficial to have the ability to divide the groups of losses into those 
who voluntarily left active service, and those who had no choice.   
4. Evaluate NFO Retention 
The final recommendation is for an evaluation of the retention of Naval Flight 
Officers, or NFOs.  Naval Flight Officers receive retention bonuses in a similar manner to 
Naval Aviators.  However, it is the theory of this researcher that NFO retention may be 
different in terms of motivators.  While some economic reasons may be the same, NFOs 
possess a different skill set than Naval Aviators.  In many cases, their job opportunities in 
the civilian sector would not be the same as those for pilots.   
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For that reason, it would be worthwhile to analyze if there is a difference in NFO 
retention versus that of pilots.  If there is a difference, then perhaps there should be 
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